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Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence
with Institutional Interests of the Administrative
Judiciary
By Harold J. Krent* and Lindsay DuVall**
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) across the country long have
sought to ensure their independence in resolving cases brought under
myriad administrative schemes at both the federal and state levels.
As have many others, they have argued that impartial adjudication
turns on the independence of the adjudicator.' Perhaps the most
fundamental precept of judging is that the adjudicator be free from
outside influence in decision making. Indeed, courts have held that
due process demands as much. 2  Judges cannot resolve issues
impartially if members of the legislature lobby them for a particular
result or if donors threaten to withhold support, contingent upon a
particular outcome of a case. At the federal level, the Article 11I
guarantees of lifetime tenure and protection against salary diminution
stand as bulwarks of decisional independence allowing removal of
judges only through impeachment. 3
*Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. An earlier
version of this article was presented as the Fellowship article at the 2004 annual
NAALJ meeting in Baltimore, Maryland.
**J.D. Chicago-Kent College of Law '02. We would like to thank Jim Rossi
for his comments on an earlier draft.
1. For purposes of this article, we use the term ALJ generically to describe
judicial officials within the administrative realm who exercise similar functions,
whether denoted ALJs, Administrative Judges, or hearing examiners. The current
controversy involving transfer of Medicare ALJs from the Social Security
Administration serves as a reminder of this concern for independence.
http://www.hhs.gov/medicare/appealsrpt.htnl.
2. "Trial before 'an unbiased judge' is essential to due process." Johnson v.
Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971). Moreover, "any tribunal permitted by law
to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even
the appearance of bias." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393
U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
3. In two hundred years, the House of Representatives has impeached only
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In light of this principle, some ALJs have vigorously combated
perceived threats to their ability to reach decisions free from outside
influence. They have challenged rules crafted to increase
productivity, enhance uniformity of decision making, and facilitate
monitoring by agency heads, as well as those that were apparently
aimed at influencing outcomes. Indeed, they successfully lobbied
Congress to cut funding for a federal agency designed to streamline
government operations when that agency recommended changes to
the Administrative Procedure Act4 that, in their view, jeopardized
their independent status within the administrative state.
5
In this essay, we fully accept the goal of decision making
independence. Decision making independence is critical to assure
litigants that judicial results are as free from external influence as
possible. Rules of recusal and prohibitions of ex parte contacts signal
to litigants that a particular decision has been reached in an unbiased
fashion. Administrative law judges cannot function effectively if
their decisions are viewed as the product of lobbying or graft.
Moreover, the appearance of propriety may, in fact, matter as much
as the reality. Litigants must have faith in the unbiased nature of the
litigation.
Nonetheless, complete independence from external pressure has
never been attained by Article III judges, let alone state court judges
or ALJs. Norms of judicial independence have long been
accommodated with other norms in our system, such as
accountability, efficiency, and quality. Article II judges, for
instance, cannot only be impeached, but their jurisdiction can be
thirteen judges, seven of whom have been convicted by the Senate. MARY L.
VOLCANSEK ET AL., JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON
(1996).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2004).
5. See ACUS Recommendation 92-7, 1992 ACUS 28-42; Paul Verkuil et al.,
The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 1992 ACUS 779-1120. See also Alan W.
Heifetz, The Continuing Need for the Administrative Conference: Fairness,
Adequacy, and Efficiency in the Administrative Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 703
(1994). Congress has recently reauthorized the Administrative Conference of the
United States. See Federal Regulatory Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
401, 118 Stat. 2255 (2004). Congress, however, did not at the same time
appropriate any funds for that purpose. See Warren Belmar, The Continuing Saga
of the Administrative Conference of the United States: Reauthorized But Not Yet
Funded, 30 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws 2 (Winter 2005).
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limited by Congress, 6 and their pay can be frozen. Congress can
overrule judge-made law, whether common law-making or statutory
interpretation, and that prospect may shape judicial decision making.
Even the power of the press can wield great influence.
State judges are even less independent. Most are subject to
election, and thus majoritarian forces directly constrain their decision
making. 8 Indeed, state court judges have been removed for unpopular
decisions, particularly in the death penalty context,9 and legislatures
have threatened to retaliate against judges for controversial decisions,
by refusing to increase pay to keep up with inflation or otherwise
cutting judicial budgets.101 States' interests in political accountability
have trumped any possibility of complete judicial independence.
Some ALJs enjoy greater functional independence than state
jurists. For instance, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at the
federal level, protects ALJs from external influence. The Office of
6. Indeed, Congress within the first generation after the founding abolished the
entire trial court system established by President Adams' administration. See
Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial
Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31 (!998).
7. United States District Court Judge Harold Baer, a former prosecutor, was the
target of vitriol after suppressing the results of a drug search. The press secretary
for President Clinton warned that, if the decision were not reversed, Clinton might
ask for the judge's resignation, and Clinton's opponent in the 1996 election,
Senator Dole, advocated impeachment. Judge Baer subsequently reversed his
decision. See Jon 0. Newman, The Judge Baer Controversy, 80 JUDICATURE 156,
156-57 (1997) (reprinting letter from over 200 members of Congress urging
President Clinton to press for Baer's ouster).
8. Judges are elected in thirty-nine of the states. See ABA, American Bar
Association Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, available at
http://www.manningproductions.com/ABA263/ABA263_FactSheet.htm.
9. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be
Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office for Unpopular
Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308 (1997).
10. Daniel C. Vock, Judges 'Can't Make Guv' Fund Raises, Chicago Daily L.
Bull. March 17, 2004, at I (governor refused to permit cost of living increase for
judiciary); Robert Robb, Courts, Legislators on 2-Way Street, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
April 2, 2003, at 11B (Chief Justice of Arizona Supreme Court alleged that
legislature siphoned away funds from judiciary out of retaliatory motive); Deborah
Fauver, ABA Commission Recommends All Judges Be Appointed, St. Louis Daily
Rec., July 2, 2003, News (finding that legislatures have cut judicial budgets in a
number of states out of retaliation for adverse decisions).
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Personnel Management (OPM) limits the involvement of agencies in
hiring and determines the appropriate pay level. Agency heads
cannot issue performance appraisals of the ALJs, nor can they
remove ALJs from office absent cause, and that finding of cause can
be reviewed by another federal agency -- the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB).'1 Outside the APA, most federal statutes
do not protect the independence of agency adjudicators as fully,12 and
protections for the state administrative judiciary vary. Moreover,
Congress or state legislatures can cut AU pay or eliminate AU jobs
altogether, and AIs are not immune from barbs flung by the press or
agency officials. Independence for all jurists may be an important
goal, but complete independence is unattainable. Majoritarian
institutions limit the decision making independence of the
administrative judiciary.
In this essay, we focus on a closely related aspect of decision
making independence that has not been addressed as fully in the
literature. Any theory of decision making independence must take
into account not only permissible external pressures, but also the
conflict between the independence of individual administrative law
judges and the interests of the administrative judiciary as a whole in
ensuring appropriate conduct by judges. Individual judges in the
federal and state systems have been subject to correction and
discipline by groups of judges in a variety of ways.
Appellate judges in the context of particular cases and
controversies long have exercised some discipline over individual
judges whose acts or behavior did not conform to accepted judicial
norms. Through appellate review, courts can ensure that lower court
judges have neither misstated the law, nor misapplied it. Judges
review lower court decisions to determine whether those judges
abused their discretion in resolving cases or controversies. Moreover,
stare decisis fundamentally limits every lower court judge's
discretion in interpreting the law. The Supreme Court has chastised
lower court judges for not following its precedent, even when events
11. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 7521, 5372 (2004). Indeed, the APA protections
insulate ALJs far more than due process dictates. Compare Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35 (1975) with Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
12. See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA's
Adjudication Procedures to all Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56
ADMIN. L. REv. 1003 (2004).
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seemingly have eroded prior doctrine. 13  In addition, individual
judges are subject to mandamus review from appellate courts for
arbitrary determinations and, to some extent, for vindictive behavior.
The independence of individual judges, therefore, is tempered by the
norms and interests of the judiciary as an institution. Through
appellate review and mandamus, appellate judges limit individual
judges' discretion to the end not only of protecting litigants, but also
of preserving the integrity of judges as a group.
Moreover, judges as a group increasingly have disciplined
wayward judges outside of cases and controversies for conduct or
indiscretions that cast the judiciary as a whole into disrepute. If
individual judges work too slowly, ignore their responsibilities,
harass litigants, or otherwise conduct themselves unprofessionally,
the judiciary's reputation as a whole suffers. Misconduct off the
bench may also impair the judiciary's standing in the community.
Furthermore, absent some intercession by other judges, the
perceived or actual misconduct of a few may result in intervention by
state legislatures or Congress that is far worse than the initial
problem. As a consequence, judges have exercised supervision over
the ethics and standards of individual judges, at times at the
instigation of the legislature. At the federal level, the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act 14 in
particular has facilitated the efforts of judges to "put their own house
in order." The statute allows judges to be chastised and their
workloads cut. Every state has established commissions, including
judges and non-judges, to investigate and assess judicial
performance. Individual judges thus are subject to the influence of an
increasingly corporate judiciary. Those institutional efforts to shore
up the integrity of the judiciary as a whole unquestionably may rob
individual judges of independence. Individual judges have asserted
views and manifested styles quite different from their colleagues,
15
13. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (stating "[T]he Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions").
14.28 U.S.C. § 351.
15. For one example, charges against the Honorable Alcee Hastings included
an over reliance on law clerks and the fact that he had spoken out publicly against
the government. See supra notes 110-11.
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and review of their work by peers may chill any unconventional
behavior.
The inherent tension between the independence of individual
judges and the interests of the judiciary as a whole cannot be avoided.
The judiciary has obligations to the profession that, at times, collide
with the autonomy of individual judges. Decision making
independence for judges and ALJs is a value, therefore, that must be
accommodated with other values within our society. Viewed another
way, AU independence should not extend to independence from
norms of the profession.
We next address the potential clash between the independence of
individual ALJs and the legitimate interests of agencies bent on
adjudicating a large number of cases both fairly and expeditiously.
On appeal from an AU, agency adjudicators review legal questions
de novo and, in contrast to the judicial system, can also review factual
determinations de novo. Legislatures have directed that it is for the
agency to make a final decision irrespective of AU findings.
Accordingly, the agency's legitimate institutional interest is to ensure
that ALJs conform to agency policy in resolving issues, and plenary
review affords the agency a potent tool in effecting that goal.
Much AU conduct, however, such as civility or delay, cannot be
reviewed in the context of particular cases. There is no readily
available mechanism for agencies to use in monitoring this conduct.
Indeed, the APA precludes agencies from financially rewarding
skilled AUs or penalizing those they deem careless. Civil service
protections in some states also limit the potential for discipline, and
no apparatus has been created such as the Judicial Councils Reform
and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act to oversee AU conduct.
Nonetheless, agencies have imposed a variety of requirements and
discipline on ALJs that indirectly are linked to performance in
particular cases. The crucial question is whether agency discipline
stems from efforts to instill professional norms or rather to interfere
with decision making. Distinguishing one from the other can be quite
difficult.
To shed light on the problem, we examine two relatively well
known examples of monitoring by the Social Security Administration
that portray the friction between regulation to skew decision making
and oversight to further professional norms. Exploring the tension
between individual adjudicatory independence and the integrity of the
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profession will not yield firm answers to all questions. But that
perspective helps explain why complete independence is normatively
undesirable, and thus illuminates the necessary balance between
interests of individual ALJs and the administrative judiciary as a
whole.
Monitoring by the employing agency is not inevitable. In the
final section, we explore alternative oversight mechanisms. No one
mechanism may be right for all ALJs given the wide variation in
statutory protection they currently enjoy. For some, agency oversight
should become more stringent given that there may be no other way
to ensure monitoring. For others, stricter monitoring by the agency
could compromise independence. Alternatively, another agency,
such as OPM at the federal level or an analogous state agency,
instead might be entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring
appropriate AU conduct. Whether such oversight would protect the
legitimate policies of the employing agency as well as the interests of
the ALJs is less clear. For another option, ALJs might enforce the
professional norms on their own, using persuasion or other means to
prompt other ALJs to increase their output or to pursue only the
strictest ethical behavior. Vigorous self-regulation, as for judges,
might forestall added agency oversight. Agencies might decide to
stay their hand in light of group efforts to instill professionalism in
the administrative judiciary. Ultimately, although the form of
monitoring is debatable, individual AU independence must in some
fashion be accommodated with efforts to instill professional norms
within the administrative judiciary as a whole.
I. DEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
There is no generally accepted framework to help formulate the
minimum indicia of independence for ALJs. The word
"independence" itself is not a term of art. For instance, in the context
of nations, independence generally refers to sovereignty.
Independence neither guarantees a nation power nor economic self-
sufficiency, but rather political self-determination.
In the context of the agencies that often employ ALJs,
independence has a very different and limited meaning. Presidents
can remove the heads of independent agencies from office only for
8 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
cause. Congress, however, can abolish the agency if it so chooses, as
it did for the Administrative Conference of the United States and the
Interstate Commerce Commission,' 6 and presidents can influence the
agency's behavior in a variety of ways. As a practical matter,
therefore, such agencies are neither independent from the president
nor from Congress. Independence simply refers to the fact that
presidents cannot remove the agency head at will.
With respect to judges, independence suggests neither sovereignty
nor security in office. Rather, independence refers generally to
judges' insulation from external pressures in resolving cases and
controversies. The federal Constitution elevates "independence" as a
preeminent value of the judiciary under Article I. Article El
provides that all judges "shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office."' 17 The protections against removal and salary
diminution have been critical to paving the way for an independent
judiciary and aim at fending off congressional and executive branch
pressure. As the Supreme Court summarized in Mistretta v. United
States, "[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on
its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship."'' 8
Accordingly, courts in both the federal and state systems have
been vigilant in setting aside judgments that have appeared to be the
product of external influence. Most of the cases explore the extent to
which a judge's financial interest can undermine the potential for a
fair hearing.
For instance, in Tumey v. Ohio a village ordinance provided that
the mayor, who was to preside over a hearing involving possession of
intoxicating liquors, would receive costs from the fines meted. 19 The
Supreme Court set aside the conviction, reasoning that:
[e]very procedure which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
16. See Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803. See also Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1704.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
18. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989).
19. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Spring 2005 Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence 9
burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true between the State and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law.
20
Similarly, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville the Court reversed a
conviction under a statute specifying that fines were to be deposited
in the village treasury. 21 Although the mayor's compensation was not
directly affected by the amount of fines imposed, the Court reasoned
that an impermissible temptation exists "when the mayor's executive
responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to
maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court." 22 In
both Tumey and Ward, the potential external influence stemmed from
the mayor's dual role as chief executive and judge. The executive
interests in fiscal health biased the proceedings. These cases reflect
the ideal of an impartial adjudication .that is the hallmark of an
independent judiciary.
For administrative law judges as well, impartial adjudication is
critical. Members of Congress or political appointees in the agency
should not be able to meddle in individual cases and, as in Tumey and
Ward, financial incentives should not prejudice the proceedings.
In Marshall v. Jerrico the Supreme Court explored whether an
administrative agency, in adjudicating fines, could keep a percentage
23
of the penalties collected for agency use. The case arose under
section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act,24 which prescribes
penalties for violation of the child labor laws. In upholding the
statutory scheme, the Supreme Court distinguished the precedents in
Tumey and Ward, in part on the ground that, even if the agency had a
prosecutorial motive to impose fines, AkLs did not. The salaries of
the ALJs were fixed, and ALJs did not directly benefit if the agency
received extra monies. The independence of the ALJs thus helped
20. Id. at 532.
21. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
22. Id. at 60. See also Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (invalidating
a system in which justices of the peace were paid for issuance but not for non-
issuance of search warrants).
23. Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
24.29 U.S.C. § 216 (2004).
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insulate the agency from a challenge to its own bias.
The Supreme Court has also focused on the measure of
independence that ALJs must enjoy. In Butz v. Economou the Court
commented that the "process of agency adjudication is currently
structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his
independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from
pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency."25 The
Butz principle was put to the test in ATX v. USDOT, in which an
airline challenged the fairness of an ALJ determination because of
perceived congressional interference. 26 Frank Lorenzo, who had been
at the helm of Eastern Airlines, sought an application from the
Department of Transportation to operate a new airline. 27 Twenty-one
members of the U.S. House of Representatives signed a letter urging
the DOT to deny the license. In part because of the high salience of
the application, the DOT set the matter for a formal hearing. At the
second hearing, the ALJ permitted Congressman Michael Collins,
who was one of the signees of the letter, to testify against Lorenzo's
application. 29  Although the court stated that the congressional
interference was "substantial enough to warrant close examination,
30
it concluded that the testimony by itself was not probative enough to
warrant reversing the decision. 31 Despite the decision in ATX, even
the appearance of impropriety can undermine the integrity of the
system. In short, for both judges and ALJs, freedom from external
influence is critical to the judicial function, even though that freedom
is not absolute.
II. BALANCING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE wiTH NoRMS OF THE
PROFESSION
In this section, we explore the extent to which judges should be
independent from pressures imposed by their colleagues, as they are
25. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
26. ATX v. USDOT, 41 F.3d 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also Pillsbury Co. v.
FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 963 (5th Cir. 1966).
27. ATX, 41 F.3d at 1524.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1527.
31. Id. at 1528.
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to a significant extent from external influence. We suggest that
decision making independence for judges should not insulate judges
from the norms of the profession, whether in terms of civility,
competence, or avoiding conflicts of interest. We expect more out of
judges than just impartiality. We expect intelligence, reasoned
elaboration, and integrity. Any goal of independence must leave
room for individual judges to conform to established norms of the
profession.
Judges increasingly have faced pressure not only from legislatures
and the electorate, but also from their colleagues. Appellate judges
have long monitored lower court judges for wayward actions in the
context of particular cases and controversies, and judicial groups
have sanctioned individual judges for boorishness or waywardness
off the bench. Judges as a group have sought to uphold the norms the
profession.
The difficulty is determining how those norms should be
enforced. A number of approaches are possible. For instance,
judges, after appointment, could be trusted to internalize norms of the
profession. Through work with other judges, they would learn the
tools and ethics of the craft. Indeed, as will be discussed, the
availability of mandamus and appellate review minimizes the risk of
any wayward judges. When donning the robes of a judge, individuals
do not always act judiciously.
Alternatively, judges as a group could attempt to enforce those
norms. Through judicial councils, they could try to encourage
appropriate behavior and discipline judges who stray too far from the
ideal. Although there may not be a consensus as to what the
appropriate norms are, councils can attempt to delineate proper from
improper judicial conduct on a case-by-case basis. The tension
between the institutional interest of the judiciary and the
independence of a judge is apparent.
Finally, and most controversially, Congress and state legislatures
could attempt to impose and enforce ethical codes or rules of conduct
on judges. The line between impermissible efforts to undermine
independence and laudable efforts to improve the functioning of the
judiciary is difficult to ascertain. Legislatures have approached the
goal of enhancing judicial performance by attempting to regulate
judges directly, by assigning the task to a third party, and by
12 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
encouraging judges to regulate themselves.
A. Monitoring Through Appellate Correction and Mandamus
History suggests that judges do not always internalize the norms
of the profession. Although individuals appointed or elected to the
bench may grow and mature over time, they may not manifest the
civility, ethics, or efficiency that the public desires. Indeed, there is
no good data to suggest how much an individual's ethics or civility
change with judging, whether for better or for worse.
Fortunately, there are some checks on conduct built into the
judicial system. Appellate judges can superintend those colleagues
who fail to conform to accepted norms in misstating or misapplying
the law. The exercise of appellate review and mandamus can protect
litigants as well as help ensure conformance with judicial norms,
even at the cost of absolute decision making independence.
Moreover, although appellate review and mandamus cannot
completely ensure that lower courts apply the law fairly and
accurately, these tools often serve as deterrents for judges and
reassure the public that a wayward judge can be reined in by the
judicial system.
Most judges within our system adjudicate disputes with efficiency
and integrity. Nonetheless, aberrational cases exist. In one relatively
notorious case, a judge ordered a sheriff to handcuff a coffee vendor
and drag him before the court, where the judge threatened him with
contempt for selling putrid coffee. 32 In another, a judge ordered a
teenager sterilized at her mother's instigation, neglecting even to hold
a hearing.33 In less exceptional cases, judges have applied the law in
countless ways that imposed huge burdens of questionable propriety
on the litigants, whether with respect to discovery orders, class
certification, or time deadlines. In all of these cases, although the
harm may have been inflicted before the wrong could be righted, the
availability of appellate review and mandamus at least served as
some recourse.
Through appellate review, judges can help ensure that lower court
colleagues do not run amok. Erroneous constructions of the law can
32. See Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978).
33. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
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be overturned, as can adventurous findings of fact. Appellate review
provides a means to check lower courts' performance.
Moreover, the prospect of review deters wayward conduct. To be
sure, many judges likely decide cases without considering appellate
review. However, concern for precedent lies at the core of the
common law process. Judges must consider precedent in their
rulings and, if they follow precedent, the likelihood of appellate
reversal is low. In addition, some judges' interest in reputation or
advancement may increase their desire to escape reversal on appeal.
34
For the most part, appellate review can only arise after a final
decision has been entered. Lower court errors therefore can cause
considerable mischief before review can be entertained, for example,
by creating massive discovery obligations or delays in remedying
grievous wrongs.
The availability of some interlocutory review can ameliorate the
otherwise intractable problem of delay. 35  Despite finality
requirements, appellate review restrains the potential for arbitrary or
incorrect judicial decision making.
In addition to appellate review, appellate judges can at times rely
on their powers of mandamus to rein in lower court judges. The writ
of mandamus is an exception to the fundamental precept that only
final decisions may be appealed. Mandamus is one of a number of
extraordinary remedies provided for in the All Writs Statute, 36 and
when issued by a higher court, essentially commands a judge to act or
cease to act in a certain way. When a court grants a writ of
mandamus, it can terminate proceedings in the lower court.
37
At common law, mandamus was "issued by any court of
competent jurisdiction and directed to a person, officer, corporation,
or inferior court to command the performance of a specific duty
34. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995); Clayton P.
Gillette, The Path of the Law Today: Lock in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 813 (1998) (discussing what judges maximize).
35. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (permitting certification by trial court of
controlling issue in case for immediate review).
36. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 16 51 (a) (1970).
37. Elizabeth A. Snyder, The Use of Extraordinary Writs for Interlocutory
Appeals, 44 TENN. L. REV. 137 (1976).
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arising out of office or station, or under law." 38 Traditionally, courts
limited the use of mandamus to "confine an inferior court to a lawful
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its
authority when it [was] its duty to do so." 39 Practically, this meant
that mandamus was used only in cases of "exceptional circumstances
amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power...."'40
This narrow definition of mandamus left the court "correcting"
only those clear cases of action or inaction that threatened the
functioning of the legal system.4 1 For instance, in a Supreme Court
case involving the government of Peru, the Court issued mandamus
to prevent the lower court from interfering with the executive's
conduct of foreign relations. 42 The case involved seizure of a ship for
which Peru claimed ownership. The matter involved the "dignity and
rights of a friendly sovereign state," and claims that are normally
settled "in the course of conduct of foreign affairs by the President
and by the Department of State.",43  Rather than "embarrass the
executive arm of the Government in conducting foreign relations,"
44
the Court used mandamus to accept the executive determination that
the vessel was immune from suit.45  In another traditional case,
United States v. Will, the Court issued mandamus where "it was the
only means of forestalling intrusion by the federal judiciary on a
delicate area of federal-state relations. ' 46 The state had petitioned for
mandamus to remand a murder case to state court because the state
had no other means to challenge the federal district judge's refusal to
38. Id. at 140.
39. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
40. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967).
41. See Brent D. Ward, Can the Federal Courts Keep Order in Their Own
House? Appellate Supervision Through Mandamus and Orders of Judicial
Councils, 1980 BYU L. REV. 233, 238 (1980) (citing Blackstone stating, "it is the
peculiar business of the Court of King's Bench to superintend all other inferior
tribunals . . .not only by restraining their excesses, but also by quickening their
negligence and obviating their denial of justice").
42. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586 (1943). See also Ward,
supra note 38, at 242 (discussing the power of review "where the action of the trial
judge might be reviewable in some future time... .
43. Peru, 318 U.S. at 587.
44. Id. at 588.
45. Id. at 589.
46. See Will, 398 U.S. at 95 (discussing Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9
(1925)).
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remand the murder indictments.
47
Although traditionally more a method of correction than
discipline, courts have broadened the scope of mandamus to
encompass general supervision. The Court in La Buy v. Howes
Leather Company held that "supervisory control of the District
Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial
administration in the federal system."48 The Court held the appeals
court justified in issuing mandamus when the trial judge failed to set
trials for two cases in which he had already heard preliminary pleas
and arguments.49 Instead of setting a date, the judge referred the
cases to a master, explaining that he had "an extremely congested
calendar," and that the cases were complex, needing a considerable
amount of time to try.50 The Supreme Court held that "the orders of
reference were an abuse of the petitioners' power under Rule 53(b)"
and "[t]hey amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial
function depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic
issues involved in the litigation."5' The Court assumed a supervisory
role and chastised the trial court judge for failing to follow one of the
norms of the profession.
For another example of supervisory mandamus, the United States
in 1977 petitioned the Tenth Circuit for mandamus to bar a particular
judge from hearing any case in which the federal government was a
52party. The petition asserted that the judge "invents and follows his
own rules, is swayed by his own preconceptions of legal procedure,
and is determined that no outside force - not the arguments of
counsel, not the holdings of this Court - shall interfere with the
conduct of his court."53 Although the judge died before the petition
47. Id. at 36. For more examples of the traditional scope of mandamus, see
generally Ward, supra note 41, at 240.
48. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957).
49. Id. at 253.
50. Id. at 254.
51. Id. at 256.
52. Petition of the United States for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition and
Petition for Order Reassigning Criminal Proceedings and Civil Proceedings
Involving the United States, United States v. Ritter 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976)
(No. 77-1829) (dismissed as moot Aug. 11, 1978). See also Ward, supra note 41,
at 232-34 (discussing the Ritter conflict).
53. Ward, supra note 41, at 232, 234.
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was decided, a number of cases have granted mandamus in similar
situations of apparent bias. In Bell v. Chandler the Tenth Circuit
granted mandamus, compelling the disqualification of the trial judge,
Stephen S. Chandler, in cases arising from the U.S. Attorney's
Office. 4 The judge had disbarred U.S. Attorney Burkett and five of
his Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and held them in contempt as a result of
an earlier conflict. 55 Unconvinced by the judge, the appellate court
granted mandamus and disqualified Judge Chandler because "the
facts alleged establish the lack of likelihood that the United States
can obtain a fair and impartial trial if Judge Chandler presides." 56 In
yet another case involving bias, mandamus was issued to disqualify
the judge in a class action suit involving asbestos-containing products
in school buildings. 57  The judge refused to recuse himself after
attending a conference on the hazards of asbestos that was organized
at the instigation of the plaintiff and was financed by funds from the
plaintiffs prior settlements. 58 In addition, most of the plaintiff's
expected expert witnesses attended the conference and presented
views similar to those they intended to express at trial.59 The judge
argued that he wasn't aware of the plaintiffs involvement in the
conference; the court held that the appearance of partiality precluded
the prospect of a fair adjudication.6 °
Another case that highlights the use of mandamus for supervision
involved a race-based challenge to Boston's elementary school
student assignments. During the trial, counsel for petitioner was
quoted in the Boston Herald, decrying the district court's failure to
certify the class of students immediately. 62 The judge for the case
responded in a letter to the Herald, and attempted to justify the delay,
stating that it was a "more complex case" than the article had
63suggested. Mandamus was granted to order recusal because the
54. Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1978).
55. Id. at 557-58.
56. Id.
57. In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764 (3rd Cir. 1992).
58. Id. at 770.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001).
62. Id. at 166.
63. Id.
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appellate court held that, due to the circumstances, the judge's
impartiality could reasonably be questioned and that it was "an abuse
of discretion for the judge not to recuse herself based on an
appearance of partiality .... 
64
Through mandamus judges have also been ordered to comply
with clearly articulated legal rules. In Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter
mandamus was used to order the same Chief Judge Ritter to transfer
his case because he had assigned cases for the district in
65
contravention of an order issued by the judicial council. In another
case of failure to follow clearly defined rules, the court in Maloney v.
Plunkett held that the deprivation of a statutory right to exercise
peremptory challenges as a sanction for misconduct was a situation
that warranted mandamus. 66  The suit involved alleged reverse
discrimination and was brought by several white Chicago
policemen. 67 After voire dire, the lower court judge discharged the
selected jury, ordered the selection of a new jury, and forbade the
parties from exercising peremptory challenges based on his finding
that both sides had exercised previous challenges on racial grounds.
68
The court of appeals held that the judge did not give a reason "for
punishing the parties in this way, other than sheer irritation at what he
considered their childish and improper behavior .. .,69
The scope of supervisory mandamus has also been expanded to
encompass an advisory role for the courts. In a negligence suit
brought by passengers injured in a bus and tractor-trailer collision,
the court used mandamus to review the power of the district court
judge to order the mental and physical examinations of the defendant,
who was only alleged to have impaired vision.70 The Court found
mandamus proper for reviewing the judge's interpretation of a
Federal Rule of Procedure, 71 effectively resolving an issue of first
impression. Not only did the Court base its decision on a duty to
64. Id. at 165.
65. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972).
66. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988).
67. Id. at 153.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 154.
70. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
71. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 35.
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enforce the rules, but the opinion also indicates that the Court
extended supervisory mandamus "to settle new and important
problems."
72
Although the scope of mandamus has been broadened, it still may
not be used as a substitute for appeal.73 Petitioners must demonstrate
to the court that extraordinary circumstances exist that need
immediate consideration, that adequate alternative remedies are not
available,74 and that there is a "clear and indisputable" right at issue
that needs protection.75 Although the threshold is high, ensuring that
mandamus is not used as a substitute for the regular appeals process,
the Supreme Court recently lessened the petitioner's burden. In
Cheney v. United States District Court for D.C. the Court held that
the appeals court erred in precluding mandamus as a means to block a
discovery order when executive privilege presented an alternate
avenue of relief.76 The Court held that, because the vice president
was involved, separation of powers considerations should have
informed the mandamus evaluation and "[a]ccepted mandamus
standards are broad enough to allow a court of appeals to prevent a
lower court from interfering with a coequal branch's ability to
discharge its constitutional responsibilities."
77
Mandamus, therefore, is most often granted when an
extraordinary need for supervision arises, or when a lower court has
plainly exceeded its jurisdiction. Thus, like appellate review,
72. Schlagenhauf 379 U.S. at 111. See also Snyder, supra note 37, at 150.
73. Will, 389 U.S. at 90.
74. This requirement acts to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute
for the regular appeals process. See Cheney v. United States District Court, 124 S.
Ct. 2576, 2586 (2004) (citing Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947)).
75. United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899). For examples in the
states, see Phillip Morris v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200 (Md. 2000); In re Sw Bell Tel.
Co., 35 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2000). See also Mallard v. United States District Court,
490 U.S. 296 (1988), where an attorney was appointed to a trial case that he
deemed beyond his capabilities to litigate. The appellate court held that mandamus
was proper to review the appointment and could be utilized to prevent a district
court from usurping power. The petitioner met his burden of proving that he was
entitled to mandamus by showing that the "court plainly acted beyond its
'jurisdiction,"' as the federal statute that authorizes judges to request representation
in in forma pauperis proceedings does "not authorize coercive appointments of
counsel." Id. at 309.
76. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2576.
77. Id. at 2580.
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mandamus has become a tool for correcting judicial error and abuse
of discretion, acting as a safety valve 78 within the confines of cases
and controversies.
Nonetheless, mandamus and appellate review both provide only
limited avenues of oversight. Judges' conduct can be reviewed in the
context of discrete cases and controversies, and then, usually only at
the end of the case. Appellate judges have no roving power to uphold
judicial norms. As Judge Harry Edwards concluded, "it has never
been assumed that mandamus or reversal are useful tools to deal with
the ongoing problems of judicial misconduct. 79
Although not traditional tools of discipline, mandamus and
appellate review may serve as strong deterrents to cabin the conduct
of lower court judges. 8° The very possibility of reversal may cause
lower court judges to think twice before issuing a particular ruling.
According to a study of chief circuit judges, both former and current
chief judges rated mandamus among the more "frequently used
mechanisms for judicial discipline," rating it ahead of impeachment,
criminal prosecution and mechanisms outside of the case and
controversy. 8 1 Mandamus and direct reversal are "constant specters
over judges; they may function as de facto reprimand for judicial
mistakes." 82  Through appellate review and the exercise of
mandamus, appellate judges can constrain the behavior of lower court
judges in particular cases and controversies.
B. Authority of Judiciary to Discipline Individual Judges
From an examination of the Constitution, one might think that
any supervision and discipline of federal judges outside cases and
controversies other than through impeachment would be
unconstitutional. The Constitution provides only one avenue for
correction: judges, like other officers of the United States, may be
78. Maloney, 854 F.2d at 155.
79. Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good
Behavior"for Federal Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 794 (1989).
80. Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 243 (1993).
81. Id. at 289.
82. Id.
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impeached for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors."
83
Yet, that constitutional provision historically has not protected
Article III judges from all discipline for their actions in a judicial
capacity. Congress and the judiciary as a whole have prescribed
duties that each judge must follow, and both institutions have joined
in formulating standards of judicial conduct. History and
contemporary doctrine both support legislative efforts to assist judges
in putting their own house in order. The line between legislation
facilitating the judiciary's efforts to impose norms on judges and
legislative efforts to discipline judges more directly is not entirely
clear, but the more leeway permitted judges, the more likely the effort
passes constitutional muster.
In the Judiciary Act of 178984 Congress established judicial
districts, specified the times and places for sitting, prescribed an oath
of office, and conferred the power on Supreme Court Justices to
appoint clerks to aid in the effectuation of judicial business.
Congress also invested the judiciary with the considerable power to
"make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting
business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to
the laws of the United States." 85 Three years later, Congress required
judges with an interest in the litigation before them to recuse
themselves from the case:
And be it further enacted, That in all suits and actions
in any district court of the United States, in which it
shall appear that the judge of such court is, any ways,
concerned in interest, or has been of counsel for either
party, to cause the fact to be entered on the minutes of
the court ... [and to transfer the case].86
Soon thereafter, Congress made it a high misdemeanor for a
district or territorial judge to "engage in the practice of law."87 Thus,
from the outset, Congress has exercised supervision over the
83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
84. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
85. 1 Stat. 83 (1789).
86. Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 278.
87. Act of December 18, 1812, 2 Stat. 788.
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qualifications and conduct of Article III judicial officers, and it has
provided the judiciary with tools to regulate the practice of its own
courts.
Early in the twentieth century, Congress began to formalize the
role to be played by the judiciary in supervising its own affairs. In
1922, Congress provided for the formation of the Judicial Conference
of Senior Judges, predecessor to the present Judicial Conference of
the United States, comprised of the chief judges of each circuit.88
Congress directed the Conference to meet annually to regulate the
business of the federal courts.
Legislative efforts to enable the judiciary to monitor its own
members continued with the Administrative Office Act of 1939.89
Testimony before Congress indicated a need for greater uniformity as
well as efficiency in managing the business of the courts. For
example, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes had urged the Judicial
Conference to adopt "a mechanism through which there could be a
concentration of responsibility in the various Circuits ... with power
and authority to make the supervision all that is necessary to insure
competence in the work of all of the judges of the various districts
within the Circuit."90  Following the Judicial Conference
recommendation, the Act created the circuit councils and empowered
them to "make all necessary orders of the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts within [each] circuit." 91
In Chandler v. Judicial Council the Supreme Court addressed the
exercise of such oversight authority.92 The Chief Judge of the
Western District of Oklahoma challenged the judicial council's
removal of all cases from his calendar. Although the Court did not
reach the merits of Judge Chandler's claim that a council could not
remove cases from his docket, the Court stated that there was "no
constitutional obstacle preventing Congress from vesting in the
Circuit Judicial Councils, as administrative bodies, authority to make
'all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration
88. 42 Stat. 837 (1922).
89. 53 Stat. 1223 (1939).
90. Cited in Peter Graham Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal
Judicial Administration, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 205 (1970).
91. 53 Stat. 1223.
92. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
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of the business of the courts within [each] circuit."' 93 The Court
sanctioned legislative efforts. that encouraged judges to monitor
themselves. Indeed, the opinion stressed that, as an informal manner,
judges had been monitoring each other for years: "[m]any courts -
including federal courts - have informal, unpublished rules which,
for example, provide that when a judge has a given number of cases
under submission, he will not be assigned more cases until opinions
and orders issue on his 'backlog.' . . . [B]ut if one judge in any
system refuses to abide by such reasonable procedures it can hardly
be that the extraordinary machinery of impeachment is the only
recourse."
9 4
At the subsequent hearings, judges testified as to the disciplinary
measures previously undertaken in the Chandler era. For instance,
colleagues prevailed upon an alcoholic judge to retire voluntarily, and
induced a judge who could not bring himself to impose a prison
sentence to handle only civil cases. Moreover, a chief judge who
perceived a behavior problem with another judge temporarily
transferred him to a place where court was never held. The Third
Circuit stripped another district court judge of all criminal cases when
he became suspected of corruption.
95
Moreover, under the Ethics in Government Act of 197896
Congress imposed financial disclosure requirements on judges.
Federal judges sued to contest this obligation to comply, arguing that
Congress had intruded into their independent domain. In particular,
they argued that the requirement of filing personal financial
statements available for public inspection intruded upon their
decision making independence. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Duplantier v. United States97 concluded that the
legislative purposes of increasing public scrutiny of judges and public
93. Id. at 86 n.7 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 85.
95. These examples are related in H. R. Rep. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980) (testimony of Hon. James Browning); Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. of
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., lst-2d Sess. 633 (1979-1980); Hearing on Judicial
Fitness, Subcomm. On Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, at 19 (1966) (statement of Chief Judge Biggs).
96. 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
97. Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979).
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confidence in the judicial process were valid. The court reasoned that
"[i]f Congress has the constitutional authority to require a judge to
disqualify himself from adjudicating certain issues on the ground of
financial interest, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), mandating a judge to
disclose his personal financial interests is a fortiori an objective
within the constitutional authority of Congress." 98 Indeed, the court
concluded by observing that, "[i]f the Act's provisions serve the
purpose of maintaining the public's confidence in the federal
judiciary, they will have served us well, despite the fact that we know
such requirements undoubtedly chip away at judicial
independence."
99
Enactment in 1980 of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act °0 arose from the continuing debate over
the best mechanism for ensuring judicial accountability. Through the
Act, Congress intended for judges to "put their own house in
order"'' and thereby uphold the integrity of the judicial system.
To trigger the Act, any person may file a complaint with the clerk
of the court of appeals, alleging either that a "circuit, district, or
bankruptcy judge, or a magistrate, has engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts," or that such judicial officer "is unable to discharge all the
duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability."'' 02 The
Act instructs the clerk of the court to transmit the complaint both to
the chief judge of the circuit and to the official whose conduct is
subject to the complaint. 1 3 If the chief judge finds that the complaint
is "frivolous," that it is "directly related to [the] merits of [a] decision
or procedural ruling," or that the matter prompting the complaint has
already been resolved, he or she may issue a written order terminating
the proceeding. 1 4 On the other hand, if the chief judge finds that
none of the above factors exists, then he must empanel a special
committee composed of "himself and equal numbers of circuit and
98. Id. at 668.
99. Id. at 673.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 351.
101. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 85 (internal citations omitted).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
103.28 U.S.C. § 351(c).
104.28 U.S.C. § 352(b).
24 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
district judges of the circuit" to conduct an investigation into the
matters raised in the complaint. 10 5 To do this, the committee is
empowered to "conduct an investigation as extensive as it considers
necessary. ' 06 At the conclusion of the investigation, the committee
must file a "comprehensive written report" with the judicial
committee, which includes findings and recommendations for council
action. 17
In reviewing the committee's report, the judicial council may
conduct any further investigation it deems necessary, and then "take
such action as is appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts within the circuit .... 108
Remedies include private or public censure, a temporary order to
cease assigning cases to the judge, certification of the judge as
disabled, or a request that the judge retire. If the council finds that
the judge has engaged in conduct "which might constitute one or
more grounds for impeachment," then it must certify that
determination to the Judicial Conference. 10 9 Finally, the Conference
itself can conduct an additional investigation and determine which
sanction is appropriate.
Pursuant to the Act, two federal district court judges filed a
complaint in March 1983, alleging that Judge Alcee Hastings had
engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts. The complaint focused
on an incident of bribery for which Judge Hastings' alleged co-
conspirator had been convicted, but for which he had been
acquitted." 10 It re-alleged the bribery count and included allegations
that he had improperly delegated too much work to clerks and that he
had publicly accused the United States of prosecuting him for reasons
of race. Hastings attempted to quash the proceedings as
unconstitutional, asserting that the Act violated separation of powers
and his due process rights. The Court of Appeals for the District of
105. 28 U.S.C. § 353(a).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 353(c).
107. id.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 354(a).
109.28 U.S.C. § 354(b).
110. See discussion in United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir.
1982).
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Columbia surprisingly dismissed the claim on ripeness grounds."I '
Concurring, Judge Edwards commented that, "[i]n light of our long
tradition of an independent judiciary that has been largely free from
legislative tampering, it is ironic that, in 1985, a member of the
federal judiciary is being tried under an act of Congress that purports
to define judicial misconduct and to authorize sanctions .... ,,112 To
Judge Edwards, "the guarantee of independence runs to individual
judges as well as to the judicial branch. '' 13
Some fifteen years later, the same court revisited the Act in the
context of a challenge to sanctions meted after an investigation by the
Fifth Circuit Judicial Council into a complaint that Judge John
McBryde engaged in abusive behavior.'1 4 In one instance, Judge
McBryde chastised an attorney for failing to require her client
personally to attend a settlement conference. The attorney was trying
to shield her ten year-old client from the man who allegedly had
sexually harassed her. The judge then required the attorney to attend
a reading comprehension course given her failure to heed his written
order about the settlement conference. The attorney complied, and
the judge then challenged the veracity of her affidavit attesting that
she had complied, requiring her to file a supplemental affidavit
detailing an account of the hours spent in the course. The court of
appeals dismissed some of Judge McBryde's allegations as moot, and
concluded with respect to an overall separation of powers challenge
that "given the benefits to the judiciary from intra-branch efforts to
control the self-indulgence of individual judges, we see no basis for
inferring structural limits on Congress's enabling such efforts., 11 5 In
dissent, Judge Tatel would have remanded Judge McBryde's claim
that the investigation was prompted by disagreements with his
judicial philosophy and thus interfered with his judicial
independence. 116  Judge Tatel echoed Judge Edwards' earlier
111. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 1104.
113. Id. at 1106.
114. See McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, 264 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
115. Id. at67.
116. Id. at 69-85.
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comments: "the principle of judicial independence guarantees to
individual Article Ed judges a 'degree of protection against
interference with their exercise of judicial power, including
interference by fellow judges."'"17
Although there have been dissenting opinions, judicial councils
and other groups increasingly have exerted pressure on individual
judges to conform their conduct to the norms of the profession."l i
This need is borne out by a recent example in which a magistrate,
incensed by an attorney who failed to appear at a conference because
of a conflict with another case, ordered that the attorney be brought
before the court in handcuffs and chains. 19 Other ethical lapses have
been punished, as has uncivil behavior that threatened to cast a pall
on the integrity of judges as a whole. As a result, the decision
making independence of such judges - at least at the margins - has
been undermined. Judges must run their courtrooms and decide cases
under the shadow of judicial disciplinary measures. Independence
has been accommodated with the judiciary's overall interest in
integrity. In a sense, judges discipline judges so that state legislatures
and Congress will not have to intervene in a more heavy-handed
manner.
III. INDEPENDENCE OF ALJs FROM AGENCY OVERSIGHT
As mentioned previously, the APA largely protects ALds at the
federal level from external influence. Agencies that employ ALJs
cannot hire or fire them, except for cause. Nor do the agencies set
117. Id. at77.
118. In this paper, we have focused on oversight of judges and ALJs to ensure
conduct consistent with norms of integrity and efficiency. Evaluation of judging,
however, can extend to the quality of judging as well, and there have been an
increasing number of empirical efforts to assess judicial quality. See, e.g., Mitu
Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Superstar
Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141 (2002);
Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299
(2004). Because any metric of quality is so closely tied to the merits of judging,
this paper does not address the propriety of such assessments of ALJs. ALJs,
however, are not likely to escape the same type of quality assessments now being
applied to federal judges and, indeed, in some states that have adopted a central
panel system, review for quality is taking place.
119. Complaint No. 88-2101 (llth Cir. Jud. Council, Oct. 9, 1990).
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their pay. In addition, ex parte discussions are limited in order to
prevent even the appearance of impropriety. 12  Although Congress
can reduce pay for ALJs as a group or eliminate their jobs altogether,
Congress cannot readily pressure any individual AU to reach a
particular decision. The issues raised in such hearings, in any event,
are unlikely to be of such salience as to attract the attention of
members of Congress. Most federal administrative judges not
covered by the APA enjoy comparable independence as a functional
matter. 121
The comparative insulation of ALJs from external influence,
however, does not suggest that ALJs should also be independent from
standards of behavior or performance. Studies confirm anecdotal
evidence that ALJs are at least as much in need of supervision as
Article III judges. 122  There are more ALJs than judges, far less
scrutiny prior to appointment, and less training upon appointment.
Instances of delay and incivility are not uncommon.
ALJs, like judges, are subject to norms of the profession. The
American Bar Association, for instance, has promulgated a series of
guidelines with which to assess the performance of all judicial actors.
Those guidelines include:
(1) Integrity - avoidance of impropriety and appearance of
impropriety, freedom from bias, impartiality;
(2) Knowledge and understanding of the law - legally sound
decisions, knowledge of substantive, procedural and evidentiary
120. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d)(1) (2000).
121. ACUS Recommendation, supra note 5, at 983-85.
122. For an assessment of charges that ALJs awarded benefits to white
claimants more than African-American claimants, see GAO, Social Security: Racial
Difference in Disability Decisions Warrants Further Investigation, GAO/HRD 92-
56 (Apr. 21, 1992). The subsequent study found that the differences stemmed from
cases in which the claimants were unrepresented by counsel. See GAO, SSA
Disability Decision Making: Additional Measures Would Enhance Agency's Ability
to Determine Whether Racial Bias Exists, GAO 02-831 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02831.pdf. For an assessment of ALJ performance
in North Carolina, see Charles E. Daye, Balancing Administrative Law in North
Carolina: A Collection: Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies and
Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1571 (2001).
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law of the jurisdiction, proper application of judicial precedent;
(3) Communication skills - clarity of bench rulings and other oral
communication, quality of written opinions, sensitivity to the
impact of demeanor and other non-verbal communications;
(4) Preparation, attentiveness and control over proceedings - courtesy
to all parties, willingness to allow legally interested persons to be
heard unless precluded by law;
(5) Managerial skills - devoting appropriate time to pending matters;
discharging administrative responsibilities diligently;
(6) Punctuality - prompt disposition of pending matters and meeting
commitments of time according to rule of court;
(7) Service to the profession - attendance at and participation in
continuing legal education, ensuring that the court is serving the
public to the best of its ability;
(8) Effectiveness in working with other judges - extending ideas and
opinions when on multi-judge panels, soundly critiquing work of
colleagues. 12
3
The ABA guidelines reflect a sensible, though hardly detailed,
elaboration of judicial conduct norms.
The Model Code promulgated by the National Association of
Administrative Law Judges prescribes similar rules of conduct for
ALJs. For instance, the Code specifies that an AU is to "uphold the
integrity and independence of the administrative judiciary," "shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities,"
"shall perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently," and
ensure "compliance with the code of judicial conduct."'1 24
Both the ABA Code and NAALJ model code articulate widely
123. ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Judicial Performance,
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance (Aug. 1985).
124. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMIN.
LAW JUDGES, Cannons 1,2,3,8 (2005), available at
http://www.naalj.org/modelcode.html (formatting in original omitted).
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held norms of conduct for ALJs to follow at both the federal and state
levels. Neither, however, suggests an appropriate enforcement
mechanism for conduct that fails to satisfy the articulated norms." 
9
Several possible approaches to fill that gap exist, including the
employing agency's efforts to impose norms, oversight by an agency
with no direct role in the litigation, and self regulation by ALJs.
A. Oversight by Employing Agency
One possibility is to entrust oversight to the agency within which
the AU operates. As with trial judges in the state and federal system,
ALJs are already subject to controls stemming both from appellate
review and from more specific monitoring initiatives.
In individual cases, ALJs are subject to appellate review at the
instigation of disappointed claimants and, at times, to "own motion"
review, or review at the behest of agency decisionmakers. As with
decisions by trial judges, ALJ decisions can be overturned on both
legal and factual grounds. With respect to law, AlJs must follow the
legal interpretations embraced by the agency - they have no
discretion to deviate from the previously set legal positions of the
agency. AI.Js are to apply preexisting legal rules, even though cases
of first impression arise.
With respect to facts, AU fact-finding may also be overturned.
Indeed, familiar standards of review from the state and federal court
systems, such as the clearly erroneous rule, do not generally apply,
125
and agencies may, if they choose, substitute their own fact-finding,
even on a cold record, for that of the ALJ.
Plenary factual review stems from a critical difference between
agency review and review by appellate courts. Legislatures have
directed the agency, not the AU, to issue a decision reflecting the
agency's position. Agencies are to interpret gaps in statutes and
regulations and determine the broad frameworks within which facts
are to be assessed. Congress and the state legislatures have vested
such subsidiary policymaking authority in the agencies, not in the
125. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000). Even though agency heads can reverse factual
findings by ALJs, they do so at the risk of creating a decision that may be
overturned on judicial review.
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ALJs. As the Supreme Court noted in Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council:
an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and
it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices - resolving
the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities. 126
Agencies therefore review ALJ determinations in the interest of
carrying out their legislatively assigned functions, formulating policy
through fact-finding and law application.1
27
There is some question whether ALJs must follow interpretive
rules or policy statements issued by agencies, which are not binding
as a matter of law. For instance, HHS issues policy circulars in the
form of manuals to govern which medical procedures are appropriate
for reimbursement. Other agencies issue guidance as to how they
intend to interpret particular statutory terms. The logic of Chevron
dictates that ALJs should follow such articulation of policy, although
some ALJs have balked. 128  Most courts have agreed with the
agencies that ALJs have no discretion to reject interpretive rules or
policy statements.
129
126. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
127. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974) ("the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one
that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency") (quoting
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)).
128 ACUS Recommendation, supra note 5, at 1005.
129. See, e.g., Crestview Parke Care Center v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 743 (6th
Cir. 2004); Nelson v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2000); Warder v. Shalala, 149
F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld the agency's right to
create presumptions arising out of particular factual contexts. In the
well known case of Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 13 the question
presented was whether an employer impermissibly discharged three
employees for wearing UAW-CIO union steward buttons. The
employer argued that, if it allowed employees to wear such buttons,
employees would think that 4 implicitly favored that union, and it
would thereby interfere with its employees' choice of a
representative.' 3' The statutory touchstone is whether the employer's
conduct discriminated against the employees by discharging them
because of protected conduct. Motive is the linchpin. The Board
created a presumption that if an employer permitted employees to
wear union steward buttons, at least where there was no competing
labor organization at the plant, then this did not imply an employer's
recognition or support of that particular union. 132 The Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed, reasoning that, after a hearing, an agency may
"infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such
conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven."'
' 33
Agencies can generate rebuttable presumptions based upon the
likelihood that certain facts will be evidence or not of a statutory
violation.
Agencies not only can create presumptions, they can derive
inferences from sets of facts based on their particular knowledge of
the field. Although they cannot, on a cold record, displace ALJ
credibility findings, they may reject AU fact-finding due to a
different view of the surrounding legal terrain. The difficulty in
separating credibility determinations made by the AU from policy
inferences drawn by the agency is apparent and illustrated in the
enforcement action in Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB. 134  The
principal question concerned whether companies had wrongfully
terminated two employees in derogation of their statutory rights
protected under the National Labor Relations Act. The ALJ, after
hearing all of the testimony, credited the testimony of the employer's
130. Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
131. Id. at 796.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 800.
134. Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).
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supervisor that the employees were dismissed because of the slow
pace of their work. The NLRB, however, reversed the AU,
concluding that, because the supervisor knew the employees were
leaders of an organizational effort at the worksite and had not
previously warned the employees, the discharge was pretextual. The
court of appeals agreed that it was the agency's province to derive
inferences from the facts found by an AU_ as long as the AU's
demeanor assessment was not disturbed:
All aspects of the witness's demeanor - including the
expression of his countenance, how he sits or stands,
whether he is inordinately nervous, his coloration
during critical examination, the modulation or pace of
his speech and other non-verbal communication - may
convince the observing trial judge that the witness is
testifying truthfully or falsely. These same very
important factors, however, are entirely unavailable to
a reader of the transcript ... But it should be noted
that the administrative law judge's opportunity to
observe the witnesses' demeanor does not, by itself,
require deference with regard to his or her derivative
inferences. 1
35
In the particular case, however, a majority of the court determined
that the Board's derivative inferences stemmed in part from
discredited testimony, and thus concluded that the discharge of the
employees should be upheld. 136 In dissent, Judge Duniway expressed
fear that ALT demeanor determinations could supplant the authority
delegated to the agency to make the necessary policy inferences based
on its expertise of labor law policy. 1
37
Consider, as well, the more recent decision in Elliott v. CFTC. 138
There, the issue concerned whether brokers had engaged in pre-
arranged and therefore illegal trades of commodities. The AU sided
with the brokers, relying on the testimony of the brokers and two
135. Id. at 1078-79.
136. Id. at 1078.
137. Id. at 1084.
138. Elliott v. CFTC, 202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2000).
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other traders. The ALJ concluded that the trades had not been pre-
arranged, but rather that the market had provided only limited
competition.1 39  The Commodities Future Trading Commission
(CFTC) reversed, relying instead on the structure and timing of the
trades. From the pattern of trading, it inferred that they were pre-
arranged and hence in violation of the commodities act.
140
On review, a divided Seventh Circuit upheld the agency. It held
that the agency acted within its expertise in overturning the AL's
fact-finding based on the inferences it drew from the patterns. In
support, it provided an oversimplified example:
[A] police officer can testify that he was suspicious of
a driver because he thought it unusual that a car was
driving slowly and not using turn signals. The officer
would be allowed to draw inferences from these facts
without presenting evidence that cars usually drive
faster on that particular street (much less evidence of
the normal speed at which they drive). The factfinder
could rely on its own experience to conclude that this
sort of behavior was out of the ordinary.
14 1
The agency thus can use its experience to override factual
determinations made by ALJs, particularly when demeanor evidence
is not determinative.
AIs' independence, in other words, does not extend to trumping
the articulated policy preferences of the agency. ALJs are bound by
all policy directives promulgated by their agency. Agency review
of AJ findings as a consequence can further political control over
regulatory policy. Thus, even more so than in judicial systems,
agency heads can monitor AU decision making through vigorous
review to ensure that ALJs are implementing their view of the law
and appropriate policy.' 
42
139. Id. at 930.
140. Id. at 934.
141. Id. at 936,
142. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized, "[a]n ALJ is
a creature of statute and, as such, is subordinate to the Secretary in matters of policy
and interpretation of law." Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Some ALJ conduct, however, may escape review in the context of
particular administrative cases, just as mandamus and appellate
review insufficiently monitor the conduct of Article III judges. To
supplement appellate review, agencies may wish to construct
mechanisms to discipline ALJs who fall behind on their dockets,
abuse the litigants appearing before them, or engage in unruly
behavior off the bench. A systemic bias against race in social
security determinations, for instance, cannot be addressed let alone
redressed in individual cases. Moreover, given that agencies often
rubberstamp a substantial percentage of all AJ determinations,
misconduct may evade meaningful appellate review.
State and federal agencies adjudicate as well as enforce the laws,
and thus in their adjudicative capacity have an institutional interest in
maintaining the integrity of the administrative judiciary. Like the
judicial councils, in other words, they oversee the conduct of ALJs to
ensure that the highest standards of competence and civility are
pursued. 143 Appellate review cannot suffice to ensure that ALJs are
civil or efficient. Nor can agencies monitor for overall accuracy
through appellate review - only the results of one case at a time can
be considered. Agencies generally can remove ALJs for good cause,
but the meaning of "cause" is unclear, 14 4 and the steps towards
removal, cumbersome. Some other mechanism, therefore, may be
necessary to permit the agencies, particularly those governed by the
APA and APA-type structures, greater supervision of ALJs.
Unlike the Supreme Court or judicial councils comprised of
Article Il judges, agency heads typically wear two hats: they resolve
administrative challenges and yet are parties to those very challenges.
The decisionmaker of last resort is also the litigant. Therefore, efforts
by such actors to ensure uniformity or increase productivity may
mask efforts to bias the decision making of ALJs to ensure that the
agency prevail more often in litigation. To that end, the APA
precludes agencies from awarding merit pay145 or financially
143. See, e.g., Brennan v. Department of HHS, 787 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(upholding suspension of ALJ for insubordinate conduct); SSA v. Boham, 38
M.S.P.R. 540 (M.S.P.B. 1988) (upholding suspension of ALJ for insubordinate
conduct).
144. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 140-
43 (1953).
145. 5 U.S.C. § 5372.
Spring 2005 Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence 35
penalizing ALJs in order to minimize an agency's ability to provide
monetary incentives for pro-agency decisions.
We highlight two examples to illustrate the range of measures
that agencies have taken to constrain AU behavior. In both cases,
understanding the tension between the independence of individual
ALJs and the interests of the administrative judiciary as a whole,
helps frame the propriety of the measure.
First, in response to evidence that ALJs were handling vastly
different workloads, the Social, Security Administration (SSA)
instituted a variety of reforms in the 1970s, including prohibiting
ALJs from writing their own opinions. The SSA attempted to attain
greater consistency among ALJs hearing disability disputes. Some
ALJs decided as many as 1440 cases per year while others decided as
few as 120.146 Similar problems have plagued other agencies.
147
Setting a goal to resolve a certain number of cases per month does, in
a sense, interfere with decision making independence. The ALJ
cannot spend the time he or she deems appropriate on any given case.
Indeed, in SSA v. Goodman, the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) blocked an SSA effort to remove an ALU whose
productivity, measured by the number of cases tried, lagged behind
the national median.1 48 Although the SSA had for years encouraged
and then warned the ALJ to increase productivity, the MSPB was
unmoved.
Similarly, in Nash v. Bowen, an ALJ challenged a production goal
as antithetical to the ideal of decision making independence. 149 The
court of appeals, however, rejected the claim, reasoning that a
production goal "is not a prescription of how . . . an AJ should
decide a particular case., 150 Assuredly, an AU might argue that a
directive to decide more cases bleeds into the merits. For example,
the AU might need to spend less time resolving claims in favor of
the Government because the reasoning in such cases is more
146. JERRY MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A
STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM, 120-21
(1978).
147. 1992 Administrative Conference of the United States Reports at 1016.
148. See SSA v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (M.S.P.B. 1984).
149. Nash, 869 F.2d at 675.
150. Id. at 680-81.
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straightforward. In order to meet a production goal, therefore, the
AL might be tempted to favor the government in a close case. But,
in the absence of any such connection between the number of cases
decided and the merits of the case, a production goal does not seem
problematic. Federal and state judges similarly share an interest in
evening the workload. For instance, federal judges long have been
chastised for not deciding their fair share of cases. 151 A judge who
works more slowly than his or her peers may impose a greater
workload on them and delay justice for litigants. The administrative
judiciary as a whole has a legitimate interest in ensuring that judges
discharge a roughly equivalent amount of work. The production goal
dispute represents a relatively straightforward example of when the
interests of the administrative judiciary as a whole outweigh the
decision making independence of particular AUs.
5 2
Agency efforts to impose goals closely tied to case outcomes,
however, are more suspect. Another example of agency efforts to
constrain behavior can be seen by examining the SSA's response to
Congress's concern over proliferation of social security disability
claims. The SSA announced in 1980 that its Appeals Council would
review the decisions of ALJs whose allowance rates of claims were
significantly higher than a national random sample. The agency
provided two reasons for targeting ALJs whose allowance rates
exceeded the national median as opposed to those with allowance
rates below the median. First, given that claimants, not the agency,
appealed adverse determinations by the AUs, review by the Appeals
Council would restore some balance to the process by ensuring that
the agency did not ultimately have to pay more in benefits than
Congress had intended. Second, the Appeals Council had previously
determined that it agreed more with ALJs whose allowance rate fell
beneath the national median than those whose rate exceeded the
median. As a result of the review, ALJs were put on notice that they
would likely be subject to review if their allowance rates exceeded
the national median. Indeed, an SSA memorandum warned that other
steps would be taken if AU allowance rates continued to be much
151. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 85.
152. Similarly, the decision making independence of ALJs is not compromised
when agencies require them to attend a program of instruction designed to aid their
judicial demeanor and their decision making accuracy. Stephens v. M.S.P.B., 986
F.2d 493 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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higher than the national median.
Targeting particular ALJs for review unquestionably can
compromise decisional independence, and the SSA program likely
was enacted for that end. Directing all ALJs to adhere closer to the
national allowance rate resembles a curve familiar in most law school
examinations. If Congress had determined that each ALJ was to
allow a certain percentage of claims - not an inconceivable notion 53
- then SSA's own motion review of wayward ALJs would be entirely
consistent with the congressional design. SSA oversight would
ensure that ALJs did not deviate from a curve, much like law
administrators attempt to rein in faculty. Congress, however, directed
each claim to be assessed on its merits. The idea of a curve
originated with the agency, not Congress. The agency's targeting,
therefore, coupled with the threat of further action if the allowance
rates did not go down, 154 cannot readily be seen as an effort to
promote uniform standards. 55 This is not to suggest that the SSA
lacked legitimate institutional interests in corralling ALJs who
manifested anti-government bias. In the Chandler and Ritter cases,
judges utilized mandamus to address very similar concerns. The
administrative judiciary similarly is vitally interested in ensuring that
AIJ recommendations be as accurate as possible. However, the SSA
should have pursued a goal of accuracy in a more evenhanded fashion
that avoided the deleterious impact on decisional independence. It
could have continued targeting ALJs who consistently misapplied the
law for discipline, or it could have suggested, without mandating,
percentage ranges of grants for particular types of disability claims
based on national or regional averages. Whether such efforts would
have been effective is open to question.
Agencies currently exercise some oversight over ALJs. Through
both appellate review and other mechanisms, agencies attempt to
153. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in
Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
481 (1990); 1992 Administrative Conference of the United States Reports at 1009.
154. See generally Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132
(D.D.C. 1984).
155. See Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (refusing
to dismiss First Amendment claim by ALJ who alleged dismissal based on impartial
decision making).
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ensure that ALJs follow the norms of the profession. That goal is
entirely appropriate. Agencies governed by APA-type structures,
however have little means at their disposal to discipline wayward
ALJs. 1 6  Any such efforts could, in any event, be problematic,
because efforts to instill professionalism within AU ranks may mask
efforts to bias decision making. Given that most agencies face a
conflict of interest in monitoring ALJs, it is worthwhile to consider
alternative oversight mechanisms.
B. External Agency Oversight
As one alternative, a separate agency could exercise the oversight
that the employing agencies often do now. Given most agencies' self
interest in the outcome of administrative proceedings, transferring
oversight efforts to a different governmental entity might reduce the
potential for impaired decisional independence. OPM, for example,
currently sets pay rates and could be charged by Congress with
greater monitoring responsibilities at the federal level. It could work
with various agencies to set production quotas or minimize decision
making errors in order to help achieve consistency and quality. The
outside agency's independence from the adjudication might minimize
the potential threat - or at least the appearance of a threat - to
decisional independence. That independence would reassure litigants
that meaningful oversight existed.
California was the first state to create an independent agency to
monitor and discipline judges, establishing the Commission on
Judicial Performance in 1960.157 Although it has rulemaking
authority over matters of judicial discipline, the majority of its
members are not lawyers although, as is typical in other states, judges
are represented on the Commission. In a sense, therefore, the
156. SSA's efforts to combat credible charges of race discrimination in
awarding claims, for instance, consisted principally of diversity sensitivity training.
See supra note 122, at 14. SSA also afforded claimants the opportunity to lodge
complaints against particular ALJs, but there was no way to police against any
systemic bias in awarding claims. The GAO report concluded that greater steps
needed to be taken, but did not recognize the limited power that the agency in fact
wielded over the ALJs in terms of their performance. Id. at 18-19.
157. See generally Sambhav N. Sankar, Disciplining the Professional Judge,
88 CAL. L. REv. 1233 (2000).
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Commission acts as an outside agency to assess the conduct of state
judges. It can act in response to a complaint or on its own
initiative.
58
The Commission can dismiss a complaint or conduct a staff
inquiry to determine if a preliminary investigation is warranted.
Based on that investigation, the Commission can issue a private or
public sanction. The Commission will schedule a more open, formal
proceeding if the preliminary investigation warrants it, or if the judge
under investigation requests it. At the conclusion of a formal
hearing, the Commission may dismiss the proceedings, censure the
judge, remove the judge or call for retirement. All Commission
decisions can be reviewed by the California Supreme Court.
The Commission's efforts, however, may not comport with norms
of the profession. Indeed, in one notable case, the Commission
investigated a judge for departing from precedent.159 Justice Kline on
the California Court of Appeals dissented in a case' 60 that applied a
prior rule of the California Supreme Court' 6 1 sanctioning a practice of
stipulated reversals, under which an appellate court is directed to
order reversal of a trial court judgment after the parties agree to a
monetary settlement. Justice Kline believed that the practice violated
the integrity of the judiciary, and thus was "disruptive of judicial
institutions" by seeming to countenance the sale of judgments. 162
Nonetheless, the Commission later charged that the very call for
integrity itself was grounds for sanction. Needless to say, it would be
very difficult for judges to maintain independence if an outside
agency could assess whether a judge followed precedent and could
discipline the judge for any unwarranted departures. 163  Rather, a
disappointed litigant's ability to appeal an adverse decision should
158. See generally id.
159. Id. at 1234.
160. See generally Morrow v. Hood Communications, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d
489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
161. See generally Neary v. Regents of the University of California, 834 P.2d
119 (Cal. 1992).
162. Id.
163. New York's commission has also reviewed allegations of conflict of
interest and bias, both of which generally can be assessed within the confines of
case and controversies. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Conduct,
54 THE RECORD 598, exhibit B (1999).
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provide sufficient protection to keep judges in line. Only if a judge's
failure to follow precedent is pervasive (as The Department of Health
and Human Services alleged about ALJs in the disability context),
would discipline outside of appellate review or mandamus be
appropriate. The incident suggests that an outside commission may
not be fully aware of the pressures and needs of the judiciary.' 64
Thus, although the Commission may ensure greater monitoring and
make judges more politically accountable, there is little guarantee that
judges will become more "professional" as a result.
Moreover, the investigations carried out by state judicial
commissions raise serious questions about safeguarding judicial
independence. In over 40 states, the judicial commissions combine
the power to both investigate and then sanction the judge - a so-
termed one tier system.' 65 Investigators enjoy the subpoena power,
and the investigations have ranged broadly, including judges'
drinking habits, 66 sexual practices, 167 and bank accounts. 68 Rules of
evidence do not apply in most investigations, allowing hearsay and
other information to be considered by the investigators.' 
69
In most jurisdictions, judges need not receive specific notice of
164. Nearly 25% of those responding to a survey by the New York City Bar
Association reported that Commission staff had been rude and demeaning to judges
subject to the charges. Additionally, almost 50% of respondents described "at least
one aspect of the Commission's procedures as being 'unfair."' See Report, supra
note 163, at 609.
165. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, State Judicial Conduct Organizations, 76 KY. L.
J. 811 (1988). For cases upholding the one-tier system from due process challenge,
see Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see also In re Brown, 512
S.W.2d 317 (Tex. 1974).
166. In re Ageter, 353 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1984) (permitting investigation into
drinking habits off the bench).
167. Id. (holding that investigation into affair impermissibly intruded upon
judge's privacy).
168. See, e.g., Nichols v. Council on Judicial Complaints, 615 P.2d 280 (Okla.
1980) (upholding bank records); In re New York State Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct v. Doe, 459 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1984) (broader investigation into financial
records upheld).
169. Compare In re Whitaker, 463 So.2d 1291 (La. 1985) (holding that
informal rules governed the proceedings that could include allegations of
misconduct before going on the bench); with In re Dalessandro, 397 A.2d 743 (Pa.
1979) (strictly following rules of evidence).
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the charges against them. 170 One judge, for instance, attempted to
vacate a sanction based on the lack of notice. He asserted that a
charge alleging "improper consumption of alcoholic beverages, and
instances of discourtesies to female attorneys, such as calling them
lawyerettes and asking why they did not wear neckties,"' 71 was
insufficient to allow him to present evidence on his own behalf. The
commission concluded that the charges were specific enough.
Indeed, most jurisdiction only allow judges limited discovery' 72 and
do not allow the judges to confront their accusers. 173 And, judges
must use their own money to hire lawyers should they wish to contest
subpoenas or challenge the commission's assessment. The state
commissions have not always acted in a manner respectful of the
rights of the judges charged with misconduct.
Ten states, however, have adopted a two-tier judicial commission
system. In those jurisdictions, the commissions act like investigators
and present charges for formal adjudication in front of a different
group of judges. In the two-tier system, fears for runaway
investigations are minimized because judges can always clear their
names during the formal adjudication. Rules of evidence are
followed and cross-examination is permitted.
The two-tiered approach, however, presents a blunt tool in cases
in which incivility or excessive delay is alleged. Full investigative
power is arguably not needed to assess whether the judge is behind on
his or her docket or whether he or she is too brusque. The question in
such cases is whether judges can alter their behavior without
sacrificing their decision making independence. A visit from
colleagues likely will suffice. Moreover, in all cases brought before a
two-tiered review system, judges still may be subject to a humiliating
and expensive investigative phase. Although the two-tier system
protects judges from unwarranted sanctions, it does nothing to
170. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 526 P.2d 268 (Cal.
1974); Sharpe v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. Ct. App.
1968).
171. In re Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1984).
172. See generally, In re Coruzzi, 472 A.2d 546 (N.J. 1984); In re Del Rio,
256 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. 1977).
173. See generally, In re Sawyer, 594 P.2d 805 (Ore. 1979); Whitaker, 463 So.
2d 1291 (La. 1985); In re Wiremen, 367 N.E. 1368 (Ind. 1977).
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prevent harmful investigations, and adds expense to the oversight
process.
Furthermore, oversight of ALJs by a separate agency would
generate considerable administrative costs. New machinery would
have to be set in motion to monitor the performance of ALJs, and the
costs in terms of resources would not be minimal. Vesting an agency
with these additional duties likely would be costly, and the
investigations and subsequent adjudication would add expense as
well.
In addition, an independent agency such as OPM is not as
acquainted with the body of law that is to be adjudicated as is the
employing agency. Such a lack of expertise might have
programmatic as well as financial costs. For instance, in the
Penasquitos Village case discussed earlier, an agency other than the
NLRB might not have been equipped to determine whether the AU's
factual determinations impermissibly favored the employer - only an
agency equipped with detailed knowledge of the workplace may be
positioned to make that assessment. Similarly, the CFTC in Elliott
determined that the pattern of the trades reflected pre-arrangement
despite the AU fact-finding. Moreover, an outside agency may be ill
prepared to determine whether an AU departed from an agency
interpretive rule. Thus, an outside agency, in determining whether
some disciplinary course is appropriate in the face of repeated anti-
employer or anti-government bias, might not be able to assess the
propriety of the AU fact-finding.
Similarly, an outside agency may not have been able to
understand and respond to the challenges confronting adjudication of
disability claims arising out of the Social Security Administration. It
may not have understood the importance of expediting the process by
prohibiting ALJs from writing their own opinions. If the outside
agency includes AUs, as the state judicial commissions include
judges, then the chances of such clash of cultures diminish.
In short, a legislative decision to empower a separate agency to
oversee conduct of AUs may protect the independent decision
making of AUs, at least more than if the employing agency were
vested with the responsibility to monitor. At the same time, however,
the norms imposed by the independent agency may neither comport
with the professional norms of ALJs nor with the policies preferred
by the agency, and the new layer of bureaucracy likely imposes
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substantial costs on taxpayers.
C. Self-Regulation
Finally, if ALJs themselves pursued self-regulation more actively,
the need for external review might diminish. Presently, neither the
ABA nor the NAALJ has taken any steps to encourage ALJs to
oversee compliance with judicial conduct.
The Judicial Councils model presents a paradigm. Through the
councils, judges have banded together to impose professional norms
on their colleagues. Although Congress has facilitated the councils'
work, judges control the process at each step. They determine
whether to investigate a particular complaint, how wide of an
investigation to launch and, if sanctionable conduct is found, what
remedy to impose. The proceedings, for the most part, remain
confidential. 74 Peer discipline can be more effective if at least the
beginning stages of investigations are not played out in public -
judges can put their own house in order. Although individual judges
have questioned the propriety of an investigation or two, the councils
have handled thousands of complaints with little controversy. And,
the very presence of the councils has seemingly dissuaded Congress
from imposing additional disciplinary or oversight measures. Judges'
oversight of each other has helped bolster judicial professionalism,
even at some cost to the independence of individual judges. Just as
legislatures needed to encourage judges to regulate themselves more
effectively, so might legislation be needed to facilitate the efforts of
ALJs to regulate themselves.
Self-regulation in the medical profession provides another helpful
example of oversight from within. Criminal and civil law constrain
physician conduct, but largely leave regulation to groups of
concerned physicians. Fellow medical professionals control
certification of physicians, as well as create and enforce a code of
ethics.' 7
5
174. All matters remain confidential except for public reprimand or referral to
the House of Representatives. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14) (2005).
175. Criton A. Constantinides, Professional Ethics Codes in Court. Redefining
the Social Contract Between the Public and the Professions, 25 GA. L. REv. 1327,
1333 (1991).
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The American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics'
76
gives the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs the authority to
investigate and discipline the ethical conduct of AMA members and
applicants. 177 Not only can sanctions include expulsion, suspension
or censure of a member, but they may also be reported to the
appropriate governmental body or state board of medical examiners.
The board may then act on the findings of the council. In addition,
many medical professional associations have adopted all or parts of
the Code and hold their members to its ethical standards.
178
Council members are colleagues that are nominated by the AMA
president for a single seven-year term.' 79  Because they are not
concerned about reappointment, they are largely insulated from the
political process, and there is consequently less concern for bias than
if the profession were monitored by bureaucrats. The system of self-
regulation allows those who know the medical profession best, the
doctors, to keep order.
As with physicians, ALJs have different specialties and work in
very different situations. Challenges to AU conduct may turn on
unique circumstances of the various administrative realms in which
they work. Yet, self-regulation is possible and, as with physicians,
may lead to great professionalization. In APA-type contexts, self-
regulation may benefit the public because there is so little that
agencies can do to monitor ALJs directly.' In contexts in which
AUs are less independent, self regulation may persuade monitoring
agencies to stay their hand to permit greater independence.
Indeed, the emergence of central panels' may facilitate the drive
for self-regulation. In roughly thirty states, some AU functions have
been pulled together under one administrative unit headed by a chief
176. American Medical Association, at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2503.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2005).
177. Code of Medical Ethics, E-9.04. Any conduct that could be criminal must
be reported to the California State Board.
178. Constantinides, supra note 175, at 1334.
179. David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organization on
Physician Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REv. 583, 588 (1994).
180. The Department of Labor introduced peer review among its ALJs even
though the consequences of a bad review was likely only damaged pride. 1992
Administrative Conference of the United States Reports at 1025.
181. See Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALI's in Historical
Perspective, 20 J.NAALJ 157, 164 (2000).
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AU. The structures of such central panels differ. In some, ALJs
receive civil service protection and therefore oversight efforts by a
chief AL may run aground at any effort to impose sanctions. The
Model Act itself embraces civil service protections for individual
ALJs. I1 2 In Texas and other states, however, the chief AU enjoys
plenary removal authority over ALJs on the panel. The chief AL can
(and should), therefore, articulate standards of conduct that all ALJs
should follow, and the Model Act provides that the chief ALJ should
"establish and implement standards" for ALJs.18 3 Chief ALJs can
discipline any subordinate ALJ whose conduct falls below the norm.
The risk that Chief ALJs do not represent the interests of AUs as a
whole exists, but mechanisms may emerge to make the heads of
central panels accountable in part to the ALJs within their
jurisdictions. Like the judicial councils, therefore, the central panel
structure might, over time, establish disciplinary systems that will
help ensure professionalism among ALs without jeopardizing
decision making independence or increasing administrative costs
significantly.
In New Jersey, the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law
charted a system to assess performance of ALJs. The information
collected from attorneys and others is then used by the Governor in
determining whether to rehire ALJs. 184 Even without a power to
remove or discipline ALJs, therefore, central office oversight has the
potential to shape conduct by demanding and investigating any lapses
from previously articulated standards of conduct.
Thus, in addition to efforts to foster competent performance, the
Chief AU in at least some states can encourage civility, promptness,
and ethical standards by threat of monetary or other sanction. Where
a panel does not exist, AILJs - with statutory authorization -- could
convene to consider complaints against their peers. Self-regulation
may facilitate professionalism within AU ranks and forestall agency
or outside commission efforts to impose greater discipline on the
administrative judiciary. This is not to suggest that the path to self-
182. See 17 J.NAALJ 313-22 (1997) (Model Act, 1-6(a)(3)).
183. Model Act, 1-5(a)(5).
184. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary:
Establishing an Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for AILs, 7
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589 (1994).
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regulation will be without obstacles, but the effort may well be worth
it to attain great professionalization and respect in the long run.
lV. CONCLUSION
Decision making independence is as critical for ALJs as it is for
state and federal judges. If the appearance of impartiality is not
maintained, faith in the administrative system of adjudication will
erode.
Yet, complete independence is unattainable. There are always
some external pressures. Article III judges face potential
impeachment and restriction of their jurisdiction, and most state
judges face the prospect of defeat at the polls. ALJs stand to lose
their jobs or pay if Congress loses faith in their efficacy.
Independence from pressures within the judiciary is both
unattainable and normatively unattractive. Judges as a group have a
legitimate interest in upholding the integrity of their profession.
Through appellate review and mandamus, they check abusive
practices of lower court judges. And, through discipline meted out
through judicial councils, they can censure conduct that threatens to
erode public confidence in the judiciary.
ALJs as well should not be independent of professional norms.
Those norms can be set by agencies that act both as adjudicators and
law enforcers. That dual role, however, breeds skepticisms about
whether a particular oversight measure is designed to instill
professionalism - quality, civility, efficiency - or to advance the
agency's financial interest as a party.
Other options exist. A different agency, such as OPM at the
federal level, may discharge oversight activities instead of the
employing agency. That supervision would avoid any direct conflict
of interest. Nonetheless, the California experience suggests that the
outside agency may neither understand the norms of judging nor
adequately grasp the policies followed by the employing agency.
ALJs alternatively should attempt to regulate their own conduct.
That effort to ensure professionalism within their own ranks may
reassure the public and, at the same time, forestall the employing
agencies from adopting oversight measures that smack of self-
interest. The trend toward central panels should facilitate
experimentation with different modes of self-regulation.
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In short, some accommodation between decisional independence
and the legitimate interests of the administrative adjudicators as a
group must be made. Decision making independence should be
pursued, but in shades of gray.

